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Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

STATE COURTS
ALASKA
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Alaska, 80 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2003)
(affirming state agency's consistency review approving an airport
expansion proposal that included filling 240 acres of coastal wetlands).
The Alaska Center for the Environment ("ACE") challenged the
Coordination's ("Division")
Alaska Division of Governmental
consistency review approving the expansion of the Ted Stevens
ACE challenged the
Anchorage International Airport ("AIA").
Division's determination, contending that the AIA's proposal lacked
the specificity required for a thorough consistency review under
standards imposed by state and municipal coastal management
programs. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial
District upheld the Division's determination, and ACE appealed to the
Alaska Supreme Court. On appeal, ACE again contested the Division's
review and proposal's lack of specificity, asserting that both failed to
comply with the Alaska Coastal Management Program's ("Alaska
CMP") consistency review requirements.
AIA's expansion proposal entailed several types of construction
projects that would require filling 240 acres of wetlands in Turnagain
Bog and Postmark Bog over a period of ten years. ACE claimed that
the Division failed to evaluate all the probable and cumulative effects
that might occur in developing the bogs because it evaluated effects
based on a model of probable uses rather than actual and specific
projects. Additionally, ACE argued the proposal failed to focus or
identify types of construction permits other than the long-term
wetlands fill permit for specific facilities located within the coastal
bogs.
Applying the substitution of judgment standard of review for the
agency's decision, the court did not review the trial court's decision,
but evaluated the Division's consistency review directly and affirmed
the trial court's finding of consistency with state and municipal
standards.
The court held that proposals including broad and
conceptual plans are acceptable when the submitting party provides
lists of all permitted uses and activities. Even though the AIA's
proposal lacked detailed plans, the provided descriptions of projects,
locations, facilities, and prohibited uses and the maps of typical project
layouts were sufficient for the Division to conduct an adequate review.
The court also held AIA's project did not need to be phased, which
would allow several consistency reviews of smaller portions of the
project throughout stages of construction. ACE claimed that phasing
was important to fully evaluate the impact on sensitive coastal areas as
the project plans developed. The court, however, affirmed the
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Division's position that segmenting a project potentially impaired a
comprehensive evaluation of environment risks, and imposing the
degree of specificity claimed by ACE was a false presumption within
the requirements of the Alaska CMP.
Determining that AIA's proposal was sufficient for a
comprehensive consistency review, the court upheld the prior ruling
that the Division correctly applied the standards of the Alaska CMP
and the Anchorage Coastal Management Plan ("Anchorage CMP")
when it approved the expansion project as consistent with state and
municipal standards. ACE's claims specifically contested the Division's
evaluation of state standards for a major energy facility, coastal
development and habitats, and geophysical hazards. Additionally,
ACE claimed that the Division's approval failed to comply with
Anchorage's local geophysical hazards standard, hazardous lands
policy, and transportation and utilities standard.
Under the state definition, a major energy facility includes a
development of more than local concern carried out in close
proximity to the coastal area and is subject to siting and other criteria
under the Alaska CMP. ACE asserted that fuel storage, transportation,
and dispensing on or near the runway for in-state energy use
constituted a major energy facility.
The Division disagreed,
contending that there was a distinction in the standard between
energy-related facilities and the use of fuel by businesses for daily
operations. The court affirmed the Division's interpretation that the
proposed uses in the expansion project constituted the latter. The
court deferred to the Division's assessment that the "major energy
facility" regulation instead applied to energy-related activities that
affected shipping routes, potential spills, and airborne emissions.
Thus, the various siting controls for a major energy facility were
inapplicable to the airport expansion project.
Next, ACE challenged the Division's interpretation of the coastal
development and habitats standards. Under the Alaska CMP, the
habitats standard requires stricter protection of coastal areas, but both
establish criteria that must be satisfied to justify development of coastal
habitats for purposes other than water-dependent and water-related
uses. The court held that the Division did not act arbitrarily or
unreasonably when establishing a public need for the loss of coastal
habitat to the airport expansion. ACE argued that the Division needed
to assess the public need with greater specificity for the different types
of proposed projects, rather than the expansion as a whole. ACE also
argued the Division did not define the potential revenue generated by
the proposed expansion, nor offer proof that it appropriately
evaluated the more strict habitats standard. The court concluded that
the Division had met the significant public need factor under the
habitats standard to justify development because the expansion of the
AIA was essential to the commercial viability of the entire state.
Further, the coastal development and habitats standards also
required the Division to assess feasible alternatives for the project and
approve the proposed development if no other alternatives are
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available or cost-effective. In its review, the Division discussed several
other alternate sites for airport expansion, but found them also in the
coastal zone and even more costly to develop. It also found no other
feasible alternatives for providing float or ski-based plane facilities.
ACE argued that the Division's treatment of all uses and activities as
functionally equivalent allowed the Division to determine that the
wetlands were the only feasible location for every single use listed.
Instead, ACE contended, the Division should have assessed feasible
alternatives for the different uses and activities. Again, the court ruled
against specificity, allowing the Division to consider "the likely mix of
future uses" rather than possible alternatives for individual uses.
Under the habitats standard of maximum conformance,
development of wetlands must not interfere with natural drainage
patterns, destroy critical habitat, or discharge toxic substances. ACE
asserted that AIA's hydrologic analysis, storm/runoff water collection
and treatment system design plan, which included offsite wetland
mitigation, failed to satisfy the maximum conformance standard.
Despite ACE's concerns, the Division found, and the court affirmed,
that AIA's proposal maximized conformance with the habitats
standard. In fact, the court cited as evidence the FAA's guidance that
offsite wetland mitigation is valuable in airport development to
discourage wildlife hazards.
Third, ACE argued that the Division lacked sufficient information
to evaluate siting, design, and construction measures in areas of high
geophysical hazards because AIA did not conduct appropriately
detailed studies.
The Division contended that studies were
unnecessary since the uses authorized in the permit were low-density
human uses and utilized construction standards in compliance with
the Uniform Building Code. Thus, the proposal effectively minimized
property damage and loss of life and conformed to both state and local
requirements. Because geophysical hazards on and around the airport
were general knowledge, the Division allowed the AIA to defer
detailed studies to later stages of the development process.
ACE further challenged the finding of consistency with the
Anchorage CMP policy of discouraging development in high hazard
areas while encouraging use of the lands for open space, recreation,
parks, greenbelts, and aesthetic purposes. ACE contended that the
location of the project in high hazard areas was inconsistent with the
purpose of the local policy. The court held that the Division's
consistency determination need only conform with local policy, not
with stated values or purposes. Regardless, the consistency review
included several value assessments of the land. For example, AIA's
proposal to build a 300-foot buffer along a portion of the airport's
boundary was evaluated by the Division against competing local
interests to maintain the natural aesthetic of the open space.
Finally, ACE contended that transportation routes and utilities
failed to comply with the local municipality's standard for review of
transportation and utility routes because the local coastal management
program requires avoidance or minimization of adverse impacts to
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coastal or freshwater marshes and wetlands due to public works
activities. Here, the court found that ACE was correct regarding the
standard of review, but the Division satisfied the requirement through
its discussion of other standards. Nonetheless, the court held that the
Division took a hard look at the local coastal management program
policies, even though it failed to mention them explicitly.
Therefore, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that AIA's
proposal contained sufficient information for the Division to conduct
a satisfactory consistency review. Further, the court affirmed the
Division's determination that AIA's proposed airport expansion
project satisfied all requirements for development of coastal areas
under the state and local coastal management programs.
DaraLur

ARKANSAS
Ark. River Rights v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, No. CA03-389, 2003
Ark. App. LEXIS 786 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003) (holding summary
judgment improper when questions of material fact remained
regarding public prescriptive easement and navigability of the waters
over Echubby Area).
Echubby Lake Hunting Club ("Club") purchased the Echubby
Areas (the Echubby chute, Echubby Lake, a ditch connecting the
chute to the Echubby Lake, and a small lake in the Coal Pile area)
from the Chicago Mill and Lumber Company in 2001 as part of a 2400acre land acquisition. Although the Echubby Area is currently covered
by water, until the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
constructed the Lock and Dam No. 2 ("Dam") on the Arkansas River
in the 1960s, the Echubby Area was not accessible from the Arkansas
River. Shortly after its acquisition, the Club applied to the Corps for
permission to construct a crossing over part of the Echubby Area.
Because the proposed crossing would block public access to parts of
water within the Echubby Area, Arkansas River Rights Committee
("Group") adamantly opposed the crossing and claimed the public
had acquired a prescriptive right to use the water. As a result of the
Group's opposition, the Club filed a complaint in Lincoln County
Circuit Court ("trial court"), seeking a declaration indicating its
ownership of Echubby Areas was free and clear without any right of
access by the Group. The Group claimed that because the Echubby
Area waters were navigable and the public had been exercising open
and notorious control over the waters for the past seven years, the
Group had acquired a public prescriptive easement over the water.
Arguing that hunting and fishing rights cannot be acquired by
prescription and that navigability of the waters should be determined
by their natural state (thus before the dam), the Club filed a motion

